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DICKINSON LA1W REVIEW

RECENT CASE
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION -

ATTORNEY -

CLIENT

"As you reread the decision carefully several times, its implications
grow. Some lawyers have actually remarked that it cannot mean what it
so plainly says - - that if someone maliciously and falsely makes a complaint against a lawyer to an Ethics. Committee and as a result the lawyer
suffers no matter how great a loss professionally or financially, he cannot recover in a civil action." 1
Such is a sample of the comments which have followed the decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Toft v. Ketchm.2 The decision was followed by
a re-hearing at which the court considered a brief submitted by the State Bar Association. The court affirmed its prior decision.
Because of the importance of this decision to the public and members of the
professions, this note is written to inform and report rather than to weigh or persuade the reader.
Plaintiff was an attorney against whom a complaint had been filed with the
3
county ethics and grievance committee charging him with improper conduct.

Subsequently plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution aginst the one
who filed the complaint. The attorney's action was dismissed on the ground that
it failed to set forth a cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the state
supreme court in the instant case.
After disposing of preliminary questions raised in the arguments, Chief
Justice Vanderbilt, for the majority, wrote:
"The basic question before us is whether public policy requires that
the filing4 of a complaint with an ethics and grievance committee be privileged."
The majority opinion then considers "two conflicting considerations of
policy".
"On the one hand, there is the injur that may be suffered by any
attorney as a result of the institution of disciplinary proceedings against
him on what turns out to be improper or groundless charges. Even if
the charges against him are found to be baseless and the complaint is
dismissed, he still may suffer from the public knowledge of these proceedings which may damage his reputation and injure his ability in the
future to earn a living...
"On the other hand, however, it is in the public interest to encourage those who have knowledge of any unethical conduct of attorneys
to present such information to the appropriate county ethics and griev1 5 CHATTERBOX 7 (1955)

New Jersey Bar Association publication.

2 113 A. 2d 671 (N. J. 1955).

3 Pursuant to R. R. 1: 16-1 et seq.
4 See note 2,supra.
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ance committee so that this court may carry out its constitutional disci-

plinary duties." 5
The majority cite the Pennsylvania case of In re Chernoff6 concerning the
purpose of disciplinary actions against attorneys:
"The purpose of disbarment is not the punishment of the attorney,
but the maintenance of the purity of the Bar. Disbarment is for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministrations
of persons unfit to practice in them."
It is then that the majority opinion decides that:
"It is only through the cooperation of those with knowledge of unethical conduct on the part of attorneys that the court is made aware
of such conduct as requires action on its part. It is thus in the public interest to encourage those who have such information to forward it
to the court through the filing of complaints with the county ethics and
grievance committees, free from any threats of or danger of a possible
malicious prosecution suit against the complainant by the accused attorney
or his friends ...
"We therefore find that the filing of a complaint with an ethics and
grievance committee is privileged and that an attorney cannot predicate
a malicious prosecution action or similar suit upon it." (Emphasis added.)
Although Justice Jacobs concurred with the result of the majority in dismissing plaintiff's action, he joined with Justices Wachenfeld and Burling in
dissenting from the proposition that any complaint made about a lawyer to such
a committee is privileged no matter how malicious or untrue it may be.
The Chief Justice suggested that, to deter malicious complaints, the supreme
court "has at all times the inherent power to punish for contempt those who may
file baseless complaints . . .and we should not hesitate to use this power if the
circumstances warrant it to protect the interest of an aggrieved member of the

bar."
There has been considerable comment on the efficacy of proceedings for
contempt acting to deter baseless complaints while not discouraging honest, wellfounded complaints. Justice Wachenfeld in his dissent stated:

"I cannot understand how the filing of a knowingly false and malicious charge against an attorney before a grievance committee to advance
private interests can be said to aid us in fulfilling our constitutional
duty to maintain the high standards of the bar or to advance the public
interest. To confer blanket immunity in such a situation will, in my opin-

ion, have precisely the opposite effect. Those who have legitimate grievances against attorneys need no cloak of immunity as an inducement to
file complaints with grievance committees. Granting immunity will only
serve to encourage the use of disciplinary proceedings as privileged sanc5

Ibid.

6 344 Pa. 527, 26 A, 2d 355, 339 (1942).
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tuaries to carry on personal vendettas and excursions of ill will disassociated from the true facts in a cause. It will weaken, rather than strengthen,
the disciplinary process and will make a mockery of equity and justice."
8
An editorial in the New Jersey Law Journal also commented on this point:
"But if the majority be right, control of possible misuse through
proceedings for contempt seems self-defeating. The risk of a proceeding for contempt could be as much of a deterrent to just complaints as
a possible suit for damages. And in the former there would not be any
jury, in which a layman would probably have more confidence."
The State Bar Association points out that "even though such a contempt were
effected promptly and in full, it would not replace the lawyer's loss of reputation
and finances. Bread would be indeed a stone for his family. The 'iffens' give
little feeling of security." 9
Not all of the discussion of the Toft case has centered around its practicality; members of the profession have also expressed concern about the principles
upon which it apparently rests. A practicing attorney, after recognizing the role
of the supreme court in "tightening controls over the conduct of practitioners
in order to strengthen public confidence in the Bar," commented:10
"It seems to me that there has been too great a tendency to lean over
backwards to protect the innocent public from the unscrupulous lawyer,
with the result that the dignity of the lawyer has grossly suffered. We
are on our way to acquiring a sort of second-dass citizenship, in which,
ultimately, we will not even be allowed to bring suit to collect our accounts receivable."
The State Bar Association has listed a few of the many questions which have
been asked following the Toft decision:"
"By what part of the oath a lawyer takes upon admission does he
give up his own guarantees in the constitutions he swears to uphold?
"If it is in the public interest to hold that any complaint to an
Ethics Committee against a lawyer, including one which is malicious and
false, is privileged, is it not equally in the public interest that all complaints against persons in all other professions and businesses - medical, dental, real estate, newspaper, accounting, etc. - be likewise privileged?
"Could and would the court create such a privilege on the basis
of public interest? ...
"Ina proper case, what redress would a lawyer have if he were aggrieved andthe Court refused to protect him?"
7
8
9
10

See note 2 supra at 678.
78 N. J. L. J. 212 (1955).
See note I supra.
Jerome J. Heyman, writing in "Voice of the Bar", 78 N.
11 See note Isupra.

J.

L. J. 220 (1955).
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The above questions illustrate the reasons for the interest in the Toft case
which has been generated in all the professions. 12 Whether the Toft decision
will stand or be reversed; whether it will be limited to the legal profession or
extended to other professions; or whether the entire procedure of filing complaints with ethics and grievance committees will be revised, are, of course, as
yet undecided. The New Jersey State Bar Association has announced that it has
made plans to ask the Supreme Court of the United States for leave to join in
any appeal which may be made to it.18
"This is a precedent setting case in which every lawyer in the country has an interest. What has happened in New Jersey, can happen elsewhere."14
HARMAN

R. CLARK JR.

12 Mr. Heyman, note 11 supra, commented: "Carrying the Chief Justice's argument ti its logical conclusion, the lawyer will now be denied the right to bring an action where a real estate
broker, for example, will not be prohibited. Otherwise the Court will have to rule that the ethics
complaint to the Real Estate Commission is not judicial, while the Bar Association proceeding
is. Either way, the result would be wholly artificial and unacceptable as a legal proposition."
13 See note 1 supra.
14

Ibid.

